Moral blame and praise for delegated decisions
A talk by Alexa Weiss from the University of Bonn, Germany
Oplysninger om arrangementet
Tidspunkt
Sted
Universitetsbyen, Department of Management, building 1834-238
Delegating decisions in organizational and everyday contexts can increase efficiency, but also diffuse responsibility and promote immorality. Six experimental studies (Ntotal = 1,946 German- and English-speakers) examined assigned blame and praise for delegated decisions with immoral or prosocial consequences. Participants read multiple vignettes in which one individual (delegator) left a decision to another individual (delegate). The delegate then made an immoral decision that served both decision-makers’ self-interest (Studies 1, 4-6) or a prosocial decision that entailed a sacrifice for both (Studies 2-3). Participants rated how much blame respectively praise the delegator and/or delegate deserved. Delegators were blamed less than delegates both when judged separately and simultaneously, reflecting a robust “delegation benefit” for blame (Studies 1 & 4). Delegators also received much less praise than delegators (a “delegation cost,” Studies 2-3). When participants were induced to consider causal roles (i.e., causal reasoning), the impact of delegation on blame and praise was amplified (Studies 2-4). Studies 5-6 examined delegation of corrupt decisions in organizational contexts. Compared to an unspecific causal reasoning manipulation, evaluating other decisional aspects, such as delegators’ mental states and their ability to prevent negative outcomes, more specifically, increased blame. These results highlight ways to effectively reduce responsibility diffusion. This work takes a novel perspective on complex, multi-agent (im-)moral behaviors. It suggest that delegation can be employed to pursue immoral goals, but may also lead others to overlook prosocial sacrifices. Blame and praise to delegators are modulated by the information that observers process, bearing theoretical and practical implications.