Educatability
Dissolving the problem of man’s uniqueness

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Department of Psychology
University of Aarhus

Abstract
This paper discusses the problem of man’s alleged uniqueness and argues for a way to dissolve it. The first section offers a rough sketch and a critique of the research programme developed by German philosophical anthropologists during the years 1928-1958. In the remainder of the paper the problem of man’s uniqueness is connected to the distinction between the observer’s and the participant’s points of view, and it is argued that the problem can only be approached from the participant’s point of view. This approach has several consequences, the most important being that facts about man’s uniqueness are normative facts. The argument is based on the claim that ‘being human’ is best understood as that which philosophers nowadays call a response-dependent property.

Keywords: Philosophical anthropology, response-dependence, participant’s point of view, normative facts, reactive attitudes.

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Jan Bransen  
Behavioural Science Institute  
Radboud University Nijmegen

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Introduction

In An Essay on Man Ernst Cassirer argues that Darwin forced us to reformulate our eternal quest for self-knowledge. Rather than straightforwardly investigating the characteristics of human nature we should appreciate evolutionary thought, engage in philosophical anthropology and focus on the question of what makes us different from other animals. In this paper I argue that this question is a non-starter, and that we should have learned this by now from the history – the rise and fall – of philosophical anthropology. My aim is, however, not negative: Avoiding philosophical anthropology is precisely the proper way of pursuing our interest in human self-knowledge. The main burden of my argument will be carried by the claim that “being human” is a response-dependent property, a claim introduced in section 2 and developed and defended in section 3. Before discussing the idea of response-dependency, though, I should like to provide some historical background that I consider to be highly instructive to the contemporary revival of a scientific interest in man’s uniqueness.

1. Philosophical anthropology

It is still quite common that departments of philosophy in countries that traditionally were inspired by German philosophy have chairs in philosophical anthropology. The name can stand for a variety of approaches, activities, debates and topics but there is always at least a historical link to a particularly productive period during which many German philosophers were engaged in a rather uniform enterprise that is, methodologically speaking, extremely difficult to characterize. For ease of reference I shall assume that the period begins in 1928 with the almost simultaneous publication of books by Max Scheler and Helmut Plessner, and ends in 1958 when Jürgen Habermas published his Fischer-Lexikon article “Philosophische Anthropologie.”

I shall reconstruct the enterprise here as a scientific research programme that consists of three distinguishable tasks. The first task is to turn to empirical research in anthropological biology, ethology and psychology in order to collect as many and variegated scientific facts that characterize the species Homo sapiens. The second task is to perform an anthropological reduction, i.e. to argue that the variety in the scientific data can be reduced to a principled distinction between mankind and other animals. And the third task is to provide an argument designed to show that we need the principled distinction to make sense of ourselves and of our place in the universe. Although each task poses problems of a methodological nature, especially the last task is intrinsically unclear. Yet, without some kind of success in accomplishing this last task, it remains unclear why we would try to engage in philosophical anthropology as a research programme. Let me elaborate further on all three tasks.

The first task of philosophical anthropology does not seem to require a method, but merely a general intellectual capacity to be a consumer of scientific data. The first step is to trust that empirical science can provide the relevant data. Although highly interesting anthropological data soon flooded the scene, a serious problem lurked in the background, namely the problem of relevance: Who is to decide how and which data are relevant, and for what purpose? Simply listening to the scientists will not solve this problem. Data cannot determine by themselves whether they are relevant or not, and ignoring the problem of relevance is not the way to solve it. Scientists have their own relevances, to be sure, but there can be no science of relevance. This problem was not clearly recognized by the first philosophical anthropologists, but the entire organisation of the enterprise implied that it was the third task that determined which data were supposed to be relevant.

Here are some samples of the kind of biological and ethological facts that featured in many philosophical
anthropological discussions: Human beings are much less specialized than exemplars of other species; they lack the wealth of instinctive responses that are so important to the survival of other species; their offspring is vulnerable much longer and dependent upon the protection, care and support of their parents; and the variety in characteristics of individuals is very much larger than the ontogenetic variation in other animals and is obviously a function of variation in history and culture.

The second task of philosophical anthropology is to make us see the pattern in the wide variety of anthropological, biological and ethological data about Homo sapiens by pointing out a principled distinction between man and animal. The idea was to define the concept of a human being as a concept that, on the one hand, is informed by and, on the other hand, generates intelligibility in an otherwise puzzling set of scientific data. Furthermore, the assumption is that defining the concept, so as to safeguard intelligibility, requires distinguishing it in a principled way from concepts referring to other biological forms of life.

Many different principled distinctions were proposed. Max Scheler (1928) claimed that only in man do we find a struggle between two basic principles: “Life” and “Spirit”. Plessner (1928) claimed that a purely naturalistic principle, “eccentric position”, could successfully serve the anthropological reduction. Arnold Gehlen (1940) came up with another principled distinction: Man alone was a deficient being (“Mängelwesen”) whose lack of natural capacities was fortunately compensated for by institutional embedding. Ernst Cassirer (1944) introduced yet another principled distinction: Only in man do we find a symbolic system separating and bridging the workings of the receptor and effector system. I could go on. Many more principled distinctions were proposed.

A complicated and dubious view of the relation between philosophy and the sciences underlies this second task. On the one hand, the idea seems to be that the sciences are able to produce facts of a foundational nature, privileged representations that provide epistemological bedrock certainties. Scientific facts cannot be denied. We just have to accept the facts about ourselves that are uncovered by empirical science. But, on the other hand, the idea seems to be that the sciences cannot meet our intellectual concerns without the interpretative aid of philosophy. According to the philosophical anthropologists, science should have the first word, but philosophy will have the last word.

The idea that philosophers can claim the last word about the distinction between man and animal seems to depend on the third task of philosophical anthropology. Defining the concept of a human being seems not to be just a matter of creating order in a set of data, but it also seems to entail the production of the conceptual resources needed to make sense of ourselves and of our place in the universe. The idea being that the concept of a human being is special in the sense that it does not merely suit our passive faculties, but should also serve our active self-understanding. The point of the concept is not merely to help us uncover a pattern in behavioural data by facilitating our needs for categorisation. According to the philosophical anthropologists, the point is also to enable ourselves to make legitimate sense of the lives we live. Think of the difference between a scientist who uses the concept of shyness merely to uncover patterns of correlation in observed behaviour, and a shy person who uses the concept to recognize and change instances of behaviour she is used to but feels entitled not to commit herself to.

According to the first philosophical anthropologists, it is essential to the concept of a human being that it serves to make sense of ourselves and our place in the universe. Scientists who claim differently, and who intend to use the concept of a human being merely to categorize scientific data, suffer from a self-deceptive lack of self-conscioussness. And those who want to use their scientific concept of a human being to make sense of themselves and their fellow human beings, should accept, according to these philosophical anthropologists, that by doing so they are actually engaging in a philosophical project, a project of active self-understanding. They are therefore obliged to accept the authority and the results of the arguments provided by philosophers performing the third task.

So what is this third task? On what grounds can these philosophers argue convincingly that we need a principled distinction between man and animal to make sense of ourselves and of our place in the universe? What makes them, and not the empirical scientists, educated intellectuals, or the general public particularly well placed to make sense of ourselves as human beings? What special forms of conceptual knowledge are philosophers capable of acquiring, and what kind of extra-empirical resources are they capable of bringing into play? And most importantly, why would these extra-empirical resources that philosophers draw on entitle them to claim that they have the last word when it comes to assessing the impact on our self-understanding of the differences between mankind and other species of animals?

Contemporary readers will know that the philosophical anthropologists of the first generation failed to come up with satisfying answers to these questions. The very idea of a last word has lost most of its intelligibility in the present post-modern era, and with good reason.
The related idea of a transcendental argument showing that certain conceptual distinctions are uniquely required for certain experiences to be possible at all (i.e., for certain data to be intelligible at all), has also lost most of its credibility.9

The attempt to use basic scientific data to support a principled distinction between man and animal made the idea of a philosophical anthropology so attractive. But it is also precisely this attempt that generated serious criticism of the very idea of a philosophical anthropology.10

The critique is three-fold. First, without presupposing that there is a principled distinction between man and animal, the data are never going to support the claim that there is such a principled distinction. The essentialism that is needed to spell out a principled distinction between exemplars of different kinds cannot simply be derived from empirical data.11

Second, if used self-consciously, philosophical anthropology as a research programme will turn out to be merely a matter of deceptive politics. Making sense of ourselves is not a matter of conducting scientific research; to depict it as such is to favour a politically harmful dogmatism.12

Third, the leading question of philosophical anthropology is a question that can only be asked from the participant’s point of view, not from the observer’s point of view.13 Therefore the question is reduced to, “What does it mean to be one of us?”, and, obviously, this is a very different question, and one that cannot be answered as if it is merely a request for missing information.14

In the remainder of this paper I will address the last question. I consider it a question that allows us to dissolve the problem of man’s uniqueness. However, this question is, after all, also easily misunderstood as an empirical question. This is precisely what seems to happen when we ask ourselves “What are the uniquely human behaviours, social practices and psychological structures that make man particularly human?”15 I have provided the historical background of German philosophical anthropology in the first section in order to discuss what it means to be one of us without making this mistake again.

2. The participant’s point of view

Peter Strawson argued that certain aspects of our experience appear in radically and significantly different guises depending on whether we experience them from the observer’s or the participant’s point of view.16 Striking aspects in this respect are our reactive attitudes to others. Reactive attitudes are typically emotional, communicative and morally relevant responses to the behaviour of others, such as resentment, blame or praise. Thus, let us assume that you note that someone has made a complete mess in your office. In all likelihood this will produce anger with this other person. But what if you, for example, discover that this other person was your three-year-old child, or you learn that it was not a person at all, but your dog, or an earthquake, or the wind. Your reactive attitude will change instantly. You cannot be angry with your three-year-old child, at least not normally if you consider the way they usually go over your office in play! And, of course, an earthquake cannot be blamed for anything.

You might redirect your anger: Someone must have been negligent (It must have been your partner…) so as to create the opportunity for your child, or your dog, or the wind to produce the mess in your office. But whether your child or dog, an earthquake or the wind has caused the mess, your attitude will change profoundly, and automatically so. Your attitude will change from addressing them as “one of us” – as participants in what nowadays is often called the deontic game of giving and asking for reasons17 – to treating them as objects to be observed and manipulated. With regard to who or what caused the mess in your room, you change from taking the participant’s point of view to taking the observer’s point of view once you learn that you cannot address this someone as a responsible agent.

From the observer’s point of view, actions and responsible agents drop out of reality.18 What remains are events to be explained by citing causes. In many cases this is a sensible strategy, often even with respect to what we would naturally be inclined to assume to be actions of responsible agents. Think of various classes of irrational behaviour: Emotional outbursts due to severe stress, the performances of people with psychopathological disorders, or think of the errors in rationality studied by e.g. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) and systematically performed by most of us. Assuming the observer’s point of view enables us to accept descriptions of events that we usually understand as actions. Assuming the observer’s point of view supports the development of sciences that might succeed in specifying special laws that describe real patterns on higher levels. Such laws would allow us to be successful in predicting, explaining and manipulating the observed events. But it would not be possible, from the observer’s point of view, to have these laws describe our actions as actions, and ourselves as responsible agents. So, if we could consequently assume the observer’s point of view to anything at all in our world, it would turn out to be a world devoid of responsible agents and their actions. Even though we might at certain times appreciate scientific research for its success in consequently taking up the observer’s point of view, I am not sure whether we
would be happy to embrace this consequence of radically eradicating responsible agency from our world.

Whether or not we would consider this a blessing, Strawson considered it to be impossible in principle. He claims that as a matter of fact (a matter of human experience) we cannot completely abandon the participant’s point of view. After all, the very idea of science itself as a human practice requires that we formulate and respect methodological constraints, and this means reciprocally accepting commitments that entitle our fellow human beings to have reactive attitudes, should we defy. And naturally, not only in conducting science do we have to adopt the participant’s point of view, but in most of our daily life. Getting along in life simply implies addressing ourselves from the participant’s point of view as responsible agents capable of and bound to give and ask one another for reasons for our attitudes and for our behaviour.

Given the inescapability of the participant’s point of view, the practice of addressing one another as responsible agents implies one question that suggests itself acutely once we realize the distinction between the two points of view. The question is that of what would justify our assumption of the participant’s point of view to one another and not to other creatures such as young children, pets, primates, etc. This, I take, is the question that fuels projects similar to the original philosophical anthropology. The fact that assuming the observer’s point of view has proven to be so fruitful to modern science, in combination with the plausibility of a Darwinian story about our evolutionary origin, has created a serious concern about the reasons that could justify our inclination to continue to adopt a participant’s point of view to one another, and one another alone. What is so special about us?

It is easy, and alluring, to mistake this question for a question best asked and answered from the observer’s point of view. Yet, when we try, we will immediately have lost the clue to determining the reference of the plural personal pronoun ‘us’. We might take it for granted that ‘us’ refers to all exemplars of Homo sapiens, but there are obvious problems with this manoeuvre. Many individual exemplars of Homo sapiens are thoughtlessly and systematically excused from being addressed as participants: Children, people with psychopathological disorders, autists, Alzheimer patients, etc. We could try to keep them in. We could try to speak for them, to give them a voice as addressees so as to justify our reactive attitudes towards them. But once we start doing this, why would we limit this attempt to exemplars of Homo sapiens? Why not give a voice to the apes, or our pets, or our domestic robots?

My point here is merely to re-emphasize that the question about whom to include as participants should and could only be asked from the participant’s point of view. It simply starts with us: Philosophers, psychologists, anthropologists, participants of the Aarhus conference Human Mind – Human Kind, etc.

A new strategy for scientifically minded agents used to assume the observer’s point of view may now suggest itself. Would it not be possible to define from the observer’s point of view the property of potential responsibility? Would it not be possible to determine from the observer’s point of view the facts about what makes a creature potentially responsible? If we could do that, we would have succeeded in providing scientific reasons for our practice to treat some creatures differently. It makes sense to treat only those interlocutors as addressees from the participant’s point of view that are worthy of our reactive attitudes: Potentially responsible agents.

The strategy is attractive, but it will not help us to get beyond ourselves. To support this claim I should like to introduce the concept of a response-dependent property. Response-dependent properties are properties referred to by concepts that have a specific response by appropriate subjects in favourable circumstances built into their content. Colours and sounds are typical instances of such properties. On this account a tomato having the property of being red is a matter of the tomato being shown to suitably equipped subjects (say, ordinary non-colour blind human beings) that perceive it in favourable circumstances (say, daylight). It would be a mistake to think that a response-dependent property is real only in the “eye of the beholder” and merely projected onto the object. The property is as objective as so-called primary qualities, in the sense that one can sincerely maintain that the property is really instantiated in the tomato “out there” whenever it shows itself to, i.e. is detected by, a suitably equipped subject. But the property is subjective too, in the sense that its being depends on its bond with an appropriately responding subject.

Facts about response-dependent properties are facts about relations between objects that have these properties and subjects that respond appropriately. Because these facts entail facts about appropriately responding subjects, they are, in an important way, essentially normative facts. Facts about the wavelength of the light reflected by a tomato’s surface are not normative facts, whereas facts about this tomato being red are. This is so because the rules that govern the correct use of the concept RED (rules that enable us to distinguish appropriate from inappropriate subjects as well as favourable from unfavourable circumstances) are implied by the fact being the fact it is.
My claim now is that being a responsible agent is such a response-dependent property too. That is, what it means to have the property of being a responsible agent is a matter of being treated by an appropriately responding agent in favourable circumstances as a responsible agent. There is a sense of circularity in this claim, but it is not a vicious circularity. What I claim is that responsible agents cannot be what they are unless they are engaged in reciprocal relations of holding one another responsible, in being committed to give reasons for their reactive attitudes, as well as, being entitled to ask for reasons for the reactive attitudes of their fellow interlocutors. It means that one cannot be a responsible agent all by oneself, but most importantly, it also means that one cannot discover that someone has the property of being a responsible agent other than by taking the other to be an addressee, i.e., by regarding oneself as entitled to one’s reactive attitudes to this other. The fascinating upshot is that responsible agency is a feature of how we get along; it pulls itself out of the hat, so to speak, precisely by our holding one another responsible. It is Strawson’s accomplishment that he has seen, and argued convincingly, that the reality of responsible agency simply consists in the praxis itself of addressing one another as participants.

3. Coming to grips with response dependency

If being a responsible agent is a response-dependent property, two interesting consequences follow that will allow us to dissolve the problem of man’s uniqueness. One consequence concerns scientific activities directed at collecting and explaining data about the make-up and the behaviour of exemplars of Homo sapiens as well as of exemplars of all the other species scientists consider to be of interest. There is much fascinating research in evolutionary biology, evolutionary psychology, developmental psychology, social psychology, primatology, anthropology, paleoanthropology, etc. There is no reason at all to stop or change any of these scientific endeavours. But there is reason not to understand this research as in any way directed at answering questions related to a principled distinction or principled continuity between the human and the non-human. No such distinction or continuity can be discovered from the observer’s point of view. Facts about the human and the non-human are response-dependent facts, facts that crucially depend on normative facts about who are the appropriate respondents and which are the favourable circumstances for the detection of the human.

The second consequence concerns the kind of activity we would have to engage in to be able to determine these normative facts. What procedures are we able to put to work to determine whether someone is capable of detecting humanhood? What kind of expertise would we need for that? And what are favourable circumstances in which to hold another responsible for our reactive attitudes? Reasoning by analogy might give us some idea of the depth and the width of these questions.

Take the example of colours. We have good reason to exclude e.g. colour-blind males as inappropriate respondents and red lighting conditions as unfavourable circumstances for the detection of redness. Nowadays we have considerable knowledge of the mechanisms that explain the inappropriateness of these colourblind males as well as the unfavourability of such lighting conditions. This knowledge gives us good reasons to exclude the colour-blind males as inappropriate respondents when it comes to the determination of colours. These reasons are grounded in an elaborate causal story that modern science can tell about the ways humans respond to reflected light.

Another example: Aesthetic qualities. Things can be beautiful, even if we fail to recognize it. This may be an analogy with colour perception. Perhaps someone who fails to appreciate opera lacks the capacities to respond appropriately to the aesthetic qualities of opera. Perhaps we could identify circumstances that are unfavourable to the detection of aesthetic qualities, such as bad acoustics. However, the extent to which the analogy is plausible is unclear. One might argue that aesthetic education differs principally from colour education. One might argue that the fact (if it is indeed a fact) that educated people converge in their responses to the aesthetic qualities of opera cannot be explained by just a causal story about an underlying mechanism. The alleged fact may reflect quite another genesis, a history that refers to reasoned ways to settle normative questions about who are to count as appropriate subjects, and which circumstances are to count as favourable to the detection of the aesthetic qualities of opera.

With respect to the topic of this paper, the concept of a responsible agent seems at least as far removed from the opera case as the opera case is removed from the colour case. I should like to draw some conclusions. First, the clear distinction between arguable experts and arguable defectives that seems to exist in the colour case, and that could exist in the opera case, seems to be extremely difficult to make sense of in the responsible agency case. The very idea of expertise in matters of responsible agency seems to be completely unintelligible. We just do not seem to have any clue where to begin when it comes to distinguishing those who have
from those who have not the capacity to detect whether someone is an addressee, and/or an appropriate subject for our reactive attitudes.

Secondly, questions about what conditions would be favourable to the detection of being an addressee seem to have a history of hot debate, without any clear idea about how to make progress. Again, the story is probably rather simple in the colour case where coloured light systematically disturbs the reliability of our responses. The opera case is more difficult since music education seems to involve so much more than a merely causal reliability. Becoming experienced in responding appropriately to what is aesthetically salient seems to involve capacities with a systematicity that cannot easily be realized in causal mechanisms. But where should we turn to in order to encounter exemplar instances of appropriate addressees of our reactive attitudes? The history of humanity may well be taken in support of Cassirer’s claim that the amount of exemplar instances of human agency is as large as the number of past, actual and future human beings.22

Thirdly, and most importantly, the normativity involved in the detection of appropriate addressees should be determined in ways that radically precede the detection of the first appropriate addressee. Things are complicated and seriously beyond the grip of unproblematic scientific methods in this respect for every response-dependent property. One might think the normativity in the colour case is simply a matter of being able to navigate successfully through a world of coloured surfaces. But everyone who has ever seen Barnett Newman’s “Who’s Afraid of Red, Yellow, and Blue” will be aware of the relevance of a variation of Moore’s Open Question Argument: “So he is able to navigate successfully through worlds of coloured surfaces, but can he see colours?”23

The same argument applies to the topic of this paper. Investigating what makes a being an appropriate participant in the deontic game of giving and asking for reasons, is not a matter of looking for missing information. It is precisely a matter of debate, of trying to conceive of arguments that would enable us to become convinced of particular interpretations of the normativity that is to govern the detection of those who are appropriate addressees of our reactive attitudes. But this is fascinatingly self-referential! What I am saying here is that the practice of determining the normativity that is to govern the detection of appropriate addressees is itself the very practice of determining that its participants are appropriate addressees. Stated differently, there is nothing to discover about us apart from what there is to decide by us.24 And what there is to decide by ourselves is a matter of finding the appropriate means to address one another and to come to an agreement about the import of the reactive attitudes with which we address one another.

Whether or not these means are merely Machiavellian25, whether or not the import of our reactive attitudes merely consists in their manipulative function26, and whether or not agreement is merely a matter of an armed peace equilibrium27, these issues cannot be settled without taking normativity seriously as normativity, i.e. without taking reactive attitudes to be invitations to share evaluations. This is not meant to be a quick reduc-tio ad absurdum of the claim that normativity can naturalistically be reduced to something that is allegedly non-normative, such as adaptivity. It merely serves the purpose of showing that investigating the bounds of the human being is not an enterprise of finding empirical data, but an enterprise of determining normative facts, i.e. an enterprise that is itself normative all the way down.28

4. Education as an invitation to be human

I should like to end with an edifying suggestion. In order to explicate what we do in making up normative facts, I should like to remind us, the community of scientific researchers, of the fact that we all have our home in the university, an institution for research as well as education. And when it comes to finding decisive data to support claims about the bounds of the human being, I should like to suggest, we should turn to teaching rather than to research, for two reasons. One, basically sociological, reason is that in educating our students we create a new generation inclined to look for decisive data about the bounds of the human being. In teaching them that ‘human’ is a response-dependent property, we might produce a next generation of scientists who will understand that the problem of man’s uniqueness is not a scientific, but an ill-conceived normative problem. If we can teach them to take this lesson to heart, they may find a way to appreciate the normative fact that whether or not some agent (be it an animal, an angel or an artefact) is a participant in the deontic game of giving and asking for reasons, this is a matter of whether our students are capable of addressing this agent as a being entitled to ask for reasons for our students’ reactive attitudes.

Secondly, the very aim of the participant’s point of view and the related deontic game of giving and asking for reasons is basically nothing but a matter of education. Education is just a matter of addressing others with
the aim of reinforcing (or changing) their behaviour, not by manipulating them, but by making them see, understand and appreciate the import and the quality of what moves them to behave as they do. Education, therefore, is just a matter of changing the focus on the behaviour itself and its consequences to a focus on the motivating attitudes, the reasons we have for doing what we do. Education will necessarily require a similar change of focus of the educators. Education is a reciprocal affair. Both teachers and students should be concerned with the quality of how they play the deontic game of giving and asking for reasons. They should both understand that every move in the game will introduce reactive attitudes that are basically nothing but invitations to share evaluations.

Three core ideas are involved in this characterization. First, reactive attitudes are invitations. Obviously, invitations have their own logic, involving power relations, role expectations, etc. But invitations also involve basic assumptions about reciprocal equality, trust and dignity, which in the case of sharing evaluations translate mainly into each interlocutor’s being a prima facie authority.

Secondly, reactive attitudes express evaluations. The language of reactive attitudes is normative. They articulate the quality of encountered behaviours, in as balanced and sophisticated a way as is possible, ranging from full approval to complete condemnation, and everything in between.

Thirdly, reactive attitudes explore the possibilities of agreement. Particularly in an educative setting they are aimed at harmony, at sharing, at reaching common ground, even when they express total repudiation. They breathe the promise of a reciprocal sensitivity to reason, to both being addressees, to being able and inclined to take one another’s responses as prima facie reasons to reevaluate one’s own attitudes and to accommodate them to what reason demands of us.

The upshot of all this for our understanding of the participant’s point of view and of the reasons we have for including those we actually include, is that we always start and have already started as insiders and have allowed our intuitions about who we think is educatable to play a crucial role in addressing others. There is no final way out to the observer’s point of view, though: Educatability is itself a response-dependent property too.

References


1 Cassirer, 1944, 18-22.
2 Scheler, 1928.
3 Plessner, 1928.
4 Habermas, 1958.
5 Schütz, 1970.

6 This last feature was the main reason for Rothacker to state that one cannot study man but only men. See Rothacker, 1950. Compare this with a recent and very similar claim by Christoph Boesch: “No chimpanzee equals all chimpanzees”. Keynote Lecture, Human Mind – Human Kind, Aarhus, 2007.
7 See e.g. Brüning, 1960.
10 Habermas, 1958.
11 See also Wilson, 1999.
12 Habermas, 1958; Rorty, 1979, 1989.
13 The distinction is Strawson’s. See Strawson, 1962.
16 Strawson, 1962. Strawson developed the distinction to defend a certain optimism with respect to the compatibility of free will with determinism, not to make sense of the difference between man and animal.
19 See e.g. Johnston, 1989, Pettit,1991, McDowell, 1985. Interest in the concept arose in the context of metaethical attempts to defend a moral realist position without the need to defend queer metaphysics.
21 There is serious research in this direction. See for instance Panksepp & Bernatzky, 2002.
22 Cassirer 1944, (p.67-71).
23 See Moore, 1903.